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When Congress enacted the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
(COBRA)' amendments to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)2
in 1985, it created a piece of welfare legislation that served to redistribute wealth from
employers to terminated employees. The decision to infringe on employers' property
rights in such an extreme manner was prompted by Congress' growing concern that
employees who lost their jobs and their health insurance at the same time would be-
come either a drain on public resources or forced into significant debt. In an attempt to
ensure that at least some terminated employees would be able to maintain access to
medical care without emptying government coffers,3 Congress decided to place the
onus for insuring terminated employees on employers. To achieve this end, Congress
compelled employers who maintained group health plans for their current employees to
provide qualified beneficiaries4 the option to continue receiving individual coverage at
a price based on the costs the employer would incur by insuring a current employee. In
conducting this coerced wealth transfer, Congress transformed health insurance from a
fringe benefit that employers voluntarily offer current employees into yet another fi-
nancial obligation employers must satisfy before they are permitted to conduct business
in the United States.5
In enacting the COBRA amendments to ERISA, Congress' intended purpose was
remedial; it wished to reduce the detrimental effect the abrupt discontinuance of health
care may have on discharged employees. At the same time, Congress acknowledged
that continuation coverage' imposes substantial financial and administrative burdens on
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1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-68 (1994).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
3. The legislative history to COBRA states that COBRA is the legislative effort to provide con-
tinued access to affordable private health insurance for some of those without insurance, without in-
creasing "the staggering budget deficits now facing the United States." S. REP. No. 146, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. 3(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 42, 43.
4. Not all "qualified beneficiaries" are former employees. 29 U.S.C. § 1167(3)(a) (1994). Both
spouses and dependents of covered employees are qualified beneficiaries. In addition, one need not be
terminated in order to receive COBRA benefits. An employee may be covered if her hours have been
reduced, as in the case of a layoff. 29 U.S.C. § 1163(l)-(6) (1994). Because most cases involve for-
mer employees, that term will be used to describe all qualified beneficiaries.
5. See Herrmann v. Cencom Cable Assocs., Inc., 978 F.2d 978, 979 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Health
care as a fringe benefit for productive workers is one thing, and as a gift to persons who have been
laid off or fired is another.").
6. Through COBRA continuation coverage, an employee maintains her right to participate in her
former employer's group health plan for a limited period. To maintain continuation coverage, the ex-
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employers. In an effort to minimize this imposition, Congress limited the time an em-
ployee is eligible for coverage and established conditions under which the employee's
right to continuation coverage terminates Thus, a former employee's right to continu-
ation coverage ends after eighteen or thirty-six months8 and may terminate earlier if,
among other reasons, the insured obtains full protection from another plan.'
Since COBRA's enactment, one of the most serious but infrequently-discussed
problems in ERISA jurisprudence concerns the termination provision of the continua-
tion coverage section. Section 1162(2)(D) indicates that an employer can terminate
coverage on the "date" the former employee who elects continuation coverage becomes
covered under another plan:
The coverage must extend for at least the period beginning on the date of the quali-
fying event and ending not earlier than the earliest of the following...
(D) The date on which the qualified beneficiary first becomes, after the date of
election -
(i) covered under any other group health plan (as an employee or otherwise)
which does not contain any exclusion or limitation with respect to any pre-
existing condition of such beneficiary, or
(ii) in the case of a qualified beneficiary other than a qualified beneficiary
described in section 1167(3)(C) of this title, entitled to benefits under title
XVIII of the Social Security Act [42 U.S.C. 1395 (1994)'0]."
Determining which insurance company bears primary liability for the insurance costs
of a qualified beneficiary depends entirely on whether the language "first becomes,
after the date of election.., covered" is interpreted to distinguish between preexisting 2
and after-acquired 3 coverage for purposes of terminating an employee's eligibility for
continued coverage. The statutory text clearly indicates that coverage acquired after the
date of election (i.e. after-acquired coverage) will terminate continuation coverage
rights. The language is less clear, however, on the question whether preexisting cover-
age terminates these rights. The circuit courts that have addressed the question of
preexisting coverage have been unable to reach consensus. The Fifth and Eleventh Cir-
employee must pay a monthly premium. The amount of the premium charged cannot be greater than
102% of the monthly premium that similarly situated beneficiaries expend for the coverage. 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1162(3), 1164(1) (1994).
7. Saltarelli v. Bob Baker Group Medical Trust, 35 F.3d 382, 387 (9th Cir. 1994).
8. The continuation coverage period is 18 months if the qualifying event is a termination or
hours reduction, 29 months if the qualifying event is Medicare entitlement and 36 months for other
qualifying events. 29 U.S.C. § 1162(2) (1994).
9. Tax Reform Act5, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1895(d)(4)(B)(ii), 100 Stat. 2085, 2938(codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1162(2)(D)(i)(1994)).
10. I.R.C. § 4980B(f)(2)(B)(iv)(I-lI) (1986).
11. 29 U.S.C. § 1162(2)(D)(i) (1994) This statute underwent a significant amendment in 1989.
Concerned about significant gaps in coverage between preexisting policies and COBRA continuation
coverage policies, Congress amended the statute to permit an insurer to terminate COBRA coverage so
long as the coverage under any other group health plan "does not contain an exclusion or limitation
with respect to any preexisting condition of [the] beneficiary." 29 U.S.C. § 1162(2)(D)(i).
12. "Preexisting" coverage is any coverage, other than employer-sponsored coverage, that the em-
ployee maintains prior to the date he makes his COBRA election.
13. "After-acquired" coverage is any coverage, other than COBRA continuation coverage, that the
qualified beneficiary obtains after the date of his COBRA election.
COBRA
cuits treat both types of coverage the same, holding that if an employee is covered by
a comparable plan on the date of election (i.e. preexisting coverage), the employer
need not offer continuation coverage.' 4 The Tenth, and more recently the Seventh
Circuit, reached the opposite conclusion, contending that the existence of the language
"first becomes, after the date of election... covered" means that the employer must
offer COBRA continuation coverage until the employee obtains alternate coverage after
the date of election. 5 Any preexisting coverage to which the beneficiary is otherwise
entitled does not qualify as alternate coverage.
How the statutory language of Section 1162(2)(D) is interpreted is an issue of
interest to insurance companies, employers, and potential and current qualified bene-
ficiaries for several reasons. First, a single interpretation of this provision will guide
insurance companies in determining what length of time they must continue to provide
insurance coverage for an employee who has suffered a qualifying event but who has
preexisting health insurance coverage under another group health plan. Insurance com-
panies need an answer to this question because providing continuation coverage for
terminated employees who already have preexisting coverage increases the risk of
potential liability of the insurer. If an employee with preexisting coverage is not enti-
tled to continuation coverage, however, the risk of liability shifts from the employer's
insurance company to the preexisting coverage insurer.
Employers should also be interested in the answer to the interpretive question
because, like insurance companies, an employer faces significant cost increases each
time one of its former employees becomes eligible for continuation coverage under
COBRA. Under COBRA, an employer may charge former employees only 102% of its
average cost of covering its current employees. 6 Although it may initially appear that
the additional 2% is pure profit for the employer, 7 in fact, the 102% rate is likely to
lead to financial strain rather than profit for the employer because COBRA beneficia-
ries in a group health plan greatly increase the average cost of coverage.
The average cost of coverage increases because inclusion of COBRA beneficia-
ries in the plan increases the insurance companies' liability risk. To understand why
insurance companies' risk increases with the inclusion of qualified beneficiaries, one
must understand how employers insure their current employees. Insurance companies
typically offer employers a group rate when they insure their current employees. Insur-
ance companies are willing to offer a group rate because insurance companies recog-
nize that in any group of employees there are likely to be employees who are healthy
and who will rarely utilize medical services. Because not all employees will utilize
14. Brock v. Primedica, Inc., 904 F.2d 295, 297 (5th Cit. 1990); National Cos. Health Benefit
Plan v. St. Joseph's Hosp. of Atlanta, Inc., 929 F.2d 1558, 1570-71 (11th Cir. 1991).
15. Oakley v. City of Longmont, 890 F.2d 1128 (10th Cir. 1989); Lutheran Hosp. of Indiana v.
Businessmen's Assurance Co. of Am., 51 F.3d 1308 (7th Cir. 1995).
16. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1164(1) (1994), defines "applicable premium" as "the cost to the plan
for such period of the coverage for similarly situated beneficiaries with respect to whom a qualifying
event has not occurred . . . " Roughly translated, this section means that a former employee who
wishes to enroll in COBRA may be required to pay no more than the average cost of medical bene-
fits for current employees, plus a 2% administrative charge. No special premium that includes consider-
ation of the former employee's actual medical needs is permitted.
17. In Lutheran Hosp., 51 F.3d at 1312, the majority sarcastically describes the opportunity to pay
102% of the average cost of coverage as a "privilege" conferred upon qualified beneficiaries. As other
places in the opinion, the majority's lack of understanding of COBRA and its costs contributes to its
erroneous interpretation of the qualified beneficiary's opportunities.
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their insurance, the cost to the insurance company is lower. As a result, insurance
companies are willing to offer lower rates to employers that purchase insurance by
group rather than individually.
When an employee suffers a qualifying event, he will opt for continuation cover-
age only when it is cheaper than insurance at market prices. For employees with health
problems, continuation coverage is a bargain because the cost of coverage is based on
group rates while the purchase of an individual policy would be cost-prohibitive. Al-
though COBRA coverage is based on group rates and therefore costs less than most
individual policies, a healthy employee may nevertheless be able to purchase individual
coverage for less than the price of COBRA coverage. Thus, it is primarily those for-
mer employees with existing medical conditions who will be interested in continuation
coverage. 8
The employer's insurer, recognizing that only these types of high-risk employees
participate in COBRA, will raise the premium rates an employer pays to reflect the
increased risk. Thus, the 102% of the pre-termination premium represents a loss rather
than profit for the employer and represents a bargain for those employees who wish to
purchase COBRA. An interpretation of the statutory language that reduces the number
of employees that may participate in an employer's COBRA plan may provide signifi-
cant financial relief for that employer.
An answer is also necessary to resolve the administrative headache that differing
rules in different circuits create for insurance companies. Under COBRA, upon the
occurrence of a qualifying event, insurance companies are required to notify employees
of their COBRA rights. 9 Absent proper notification of eligibility, many employers
and insurance companies have been held liable for significant fines.2" So long as dif-
ferent rules prevail in different circuits, insurance companies are faced with the daunt-
ing task of determining which employees are entitled to elect COBRA coverage and
then notifying them of their rights.
In addition, the confusion surrounding the obligation of employers to provide
continuation coverage has caused employers to unintentionally misinform former em-
ployees that they are entitled to continuation coverage when they were not. In many of
these cases, employees have claimed that the employer is equitably estopped from
denying continuation coverage even though the employer was not required by the stat-
18. In fact, a study by the International Foundation of Employee Benefit Plans establishes that
COBRA beneficiaries use 150 to 500 percent more medical services than active employees. See South
Dakota Supreme Court Holds That COBRA Remains Available Despite Medicare Coverage Obtained
Prior To Termination Of Employment, 2 No. 5 ERISA LMG. REP. 7 (1993).
19. The notification requirements are extensive. For instance, at the commencement of coverage,
the group health plan must provide written notice to each covered employee, his or her spouse and
dependents, of their continuation coverage rights. 29 U.S.C. § 1166(a)(1) (1994). In addition, the em-
ployer must notify the administrator of a plan within thirty days of the termination of a covered em-
ployee. 29 U.S.C. § 1166(a)(2) (1994). Finally, the administrator must notify the covered employee, his
or her spouse and dependents, of their continuation coverage rights within fourteen days of the
administrator's notice that the employee was terminated. 29 U.S.C. § 1166(a)(4), (c) (1994).
20. If a court finds that the plan administrator failed to issue the required notice, it can order the
administrator to pay a statutory fine of up to $100 per day as well as attorney's fees. 29 U.S.C. §
1132(c)(1) (1994). This may amount to a significant fine because cases take several years to get to
trial and the fines accumulate from the date of the qualifying event. See Phillips v. Riverside Inc., 796
F. Supp. 403 (E.D. Ark. 1992) (holding pension plan administrator who failed to provide notice of
continuation coverage rights liable for medical bills incurred during eighteen month period following
qualifying event); Poole v. Monmouth College, 603 A.2d 118 (N.J. 1991).
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ute to provide such coverage." In order to ensure that COBRA is providing coverage
to those former employees Congress deemed qualified, courts should adopt a single
interpretation so that a uniform notification method may be developed. A clear under-
standing of COBRA requirements will also help to avert frequent challenges on estop-
pel or failure to notify grounds.
Properly interpreting statutory language is never an easy task and the COBRA
interpretation question at issue has been a difficult one for courts to resolve. In fact,
the circuit courts have managed to create two different and contradictory interpreta-
tions with both sides contending that their interpretation results from a plain-language
analysis of the statute. According to the Seventh Circuit, the plain language clearly
provides that "an employee loses the right to continuation coverage only if he or she
chooses after the election date to accept coverage under another group health plan."22
The Eleventh Circuit, by contrast, states that the language "permit[s] employers to
terminate continuation coverage whenever an employee receiving such coverage was
protected by another group health plan .... This clearly includes employees covered
under their spouses' preexisting group health plans."23 Obviously, both interpretations
cannot reflect the "plain language" of the statute because, by definition, plain language
can lead to only one answer. As a result, either one of the interpretations is "plainly"
incorrect, or the language is not plain and some interpretive principle or principles
must be used to determine the correct answer.
Reconciling the contradictory interpretations of Section 1162(2)(D)(i) offers an
opportunity to improve the efficiency, predictability, and fairness of COBRA for all
concerned. Part I of this article reviews the case law surrounding the judicial construc-
tion of what "first becomes, after the date of election... covered" means. The courts are
split on this issue. The better view considers the language of the statute together with
the statute's purpose, which is temporary unitary coverage. Part II reviews several
commonly adopted methods of statutory construction and then applies each method,
demonstrating the persuasiveness of a construction of 1162(2)(D)(i) that interprets
"first becomes, after the date of election... covered" as terminating continuation cover-
age if an employee has preexisting coverage with no significant gaps in coverage. Part
III contends that from both an economic and pragmatic point of view, the only accept-
able interpretation of the statutory language would treat preexisting and after-acquired
coverage the same.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE CONTINUATION COVERAGE TERMINATION
CONDITION
The first prominent court to interpret the "first becomes" language did so against
a backdrop of remarkably sympathetic facts. Perhaps as a result, the court took a broad
view of the employee's rights under COBRA. The Tenth Circuit, in Oakley v. City of
21. National Cos., 929 F.2d at 1558 (holding that a former employer was estopped to deny cover-
age to a former employee after representing to the employee that he was entitled to continuation cov-
erage even though, under the COBRA statute, the employee was not eligible); Brock, 904 F.2d at 296.
22. Lutheran Hosp., 51 F.3d at 1312.
23. National Cos., 929 F.2d at 1570.
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Longmont,24 held that Oakley, a city firefighter who had received a serious head inju-
ry in an auto accident, was entitled to COBRA continuation coverage after his termina-
tion. At the time of his termination, Oakley elected to purchase continuation coverage
from his employer because his insurance plan covered the expensive rehabilitative
therapy he was undergoing as a result of his accident. The city rejected Oakley's elec-
tion because Oakley was covered as a dependent under his wife's health insurance
policy. Unfortunately for the Oakleys, the wife's insurance policy did not cover the
costs of the therapy.'
Determining whether the city was obligated to offer continuation coverage re-
quired the Tenth Circuit to interpret 42 U.S.C. § 300bb-2(2)(D)(i). 26 The court deter-
mined that the language of Section 300bb-2(2)(D)(i) limited the employer's power to
terminate or refuse to offer continuation coverage to an employee covered under a
preexisting plan.27 According to the court, the language "first becomes, after the date
of election... covered" could only terminate the right to continuation coverage if the
other coverage was acquired after the employee's date of election.2' Coverage ob-
tained prior to the date of election did not trigger the terminating condition and there-
fore did not permit the employer to deny continuation coverage. 29 Thus, Oakley's pre-
existing coverage did not disqualify him from receiving continuation coverage from the
city.
The Oakley court stated that this conclusion was "premised" on the contempora-
neous legislative history of the COBRA amendment.3" According to the court, the
legislative history supported its interpretation of Section 300bb-2(2)(B) as a limitation
on the employer's power to refuse to offer continuation coverage. The court noted that
the House Conference Report for the original statute indicated that coverage would last
until "the qualified beneficiary is covered under another group health plan as a result
of employment, reemployment, or remarriage., '3' Because Oakley's alternate coverage
did not occur as a result of any event relating to Oakley's own employment or marital
status after the qualifying event occurred, the continuation coverage could not be ter-
minated. The amendment of Section 300bb-2(2)(B) to permit termination of continua-
tion coverage whenever a former employee becomes covered under a group health plan
"as an employee or otherwise" did not affect the Oakley court's reasoning. According
to the court, the "otherwise" language encompassed only the events of reemployment
or remarriage and was not intended to allow the employer to terminate coverage where
the employee had preexisting coverage under a spouse's plan.32
The Oakley court's analysis of the Conference Report is problematic. First, the
Tenth Circuit interpretation of the phrase "as an employee or otherwise" rested solely
on its reading of the legislative history accompanying COBRA. According to
24. 890 F.2d 1128 (10th Cir. 1989).
25. Id. at 1130.
26. Statutory provisions added by COBRA appear in the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 at I.R.C.
§ 4980B(f)(2)(B)(iv)(I) (1986), in ERISA as 29 U.S.C. § 1162(2)(D)(i) (1986), and in the Public
Health Service Act as 42 U.S.C. § 300bb-2(2)(D)(i) (1986). These provisions include the same contin-
uation coverage language.




31. Id. (quoting H.R. 3128, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), 131 CONG. REc. 38,285-86 (1985)).
32. Oakley, 890 F.2d at 1132.
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COBRA's legislative history, this language meant that coverage would be terminated
only by reemployment or remarriage. To fully understand the language, however, one
must examine the legislative history of the Tax Reform Act, where the phrase originat-
ed. While it is true that the legislative history of the COBRA provision limited termi-
nation of coverage to reemployment or remarriage, the Tax Reform Act amended
COBRA's "other coverage" provision to provide for the "[tiermination of continuation
coverage upon coverage by [anlother group health plan rather than upon reemployment
or remarriage."" Congress' use of such expansive language shows an intent to explic-
itly authorize employers to terminate continuation coverage if their former employee
obtained alternate group health coverage, without regard to the timing of the acquisi-
tion.34 Because the Tenth Circuit ignored this provision and chose, instead, to rely on
superseded legislative history, its interpretation is flawed.
The apparent unfairness of Oakley's predicament likely motivated the Oakley
result. At the time of the Oakley decision, Section 300bb-2(2)(D)(i) permitted termina-
tion of continuation coverage without regard to whether the beneficiary's preexisting
condition would be covered under the spouse's policy. In Oakley's case, application of
this rule denied Oakley coverage for his expensive rehabilitative therapy because
Oakley's wife's coverage excluded Oakley's preexisting condition. This was, according
to the Tenth Circuit, "the precise gap in coverage which troubled Congress. '35 Absent
the intervention of the Tenth Circuit, Oakley would have had to bear the cost of his
therapy. However, the Oakley court, apparently unable to ignore a balance of equities,
mistook sympathy for justice and, in the process, established a baseline interpretation
for the statutory language at issue that was inconsistent with the purpose of the CO-
BRA statute.
Ten days after the Tenth Circuit identified the unfairness of the termination
clause for those with preexisting conditions, Congress amended COBRA to include a
limitation for preexisting conditions. The statute stated that any group health plan ter-
minating coverage under COBRA could not "contain any exclusion or limitation with
respect to any preexisting condition of such beneficiary."36 This section of the statute,
still present today, resolves the problem of gaps in coverage for preexisting conditions
like that present in the Oakley case. The amendment, however, did not address the
problem the other circuit courts were left to grapple with whether the existence of
preexisting coverage without any exclusion for preexisting conditions justifies an
employer's refusal to offer continuation coverage to former employees.37
33. National Cos., 929 F.2d at 1570-71 (citing Tax Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 99-514, §
1895(d)(4), 100 Stat. 2085, 2938) (emphasis added).
34. There may be instances where the preexisting group health coverage has significant gaps in
coverage when compared to the employer's plan. In those cases, the former employee remains eligible
for continuation coverage because the employee is not actually "covered" by the preexisting group
coverage. National Cos., 929 F.2d at 1571.
35. Oakley, 890 F.2d at 1131.
36. 29 U.S.C. § 1162(2)(D)(i) (1994).
37. Congress' failure to amend the "first becomes" language to address the Oakley case should
not be interpreted as an approval of the decision. The proximity in time between the amendment and
the Oakley decision, when considered in light of Congress' typically glacial decision-making pace,
makes it hard to believe that Congress' action was intended to address the Oakley case. See Deborah
A. Liebman, Preexisting Coverage and Gaps in Coverage Under COBRA, 17 J. OF PENSION PLANNING
AND COMPLIANCE 45, 48 (Winter 1991) (agreeing that inaction in congressional amendment regarding
"first becomes" language should not be considered "tacit approval" of the Oakley decision).
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The court in Brock v. Primedica38 answered this question for the Fifth Circuit,
rejecting the Tenth Circuit's analysis of the statutory language and, instead, concluding
that preexisting coverage renders an employee ineligible for continuation coverage
under COBRA, absent significant gaps in coverage. Mrs. Brock was covered both by
her employer's health plan and as a dependent under her husband's health plan.39 At
the time of her termination, Primedica informed Mrs. Brock that she would not be
eligible for continuation coverage if she was covered under another health plan.'
Mrs. Brock ignored this missive and attempted to continue her coverage under the
Primedica policy after her termination by paying the required premium.4 Once
Primedica discovered that Mrs. Brock had other coverage, it denied claims she had
submitted under its plan, notified her of her ineligibility and refunded her premiums.4 2
On appeal from summary judgment, Mrs. Brock contended that she had not been
notified properly of the limitations to her eligibility for coverage and that, because
Primedica accepted her premiums, it should be estopped from denying continuation
coverage.43 The Fifth Circuit rejected both claims. In addition, it discussed the Oakley
decision, emphasizing that the result in that case turned not on the interpretation of the
"first becomes, after the date of election, covered" language, but rather on the charac-
ter of the secondary coverage." Because of the significant gap in coverage in Oakley,
it was proper for the Tenth Circuit to require continuation coverage. According to the
Brock court, the Oakley decision and the subsequent amendment to ERISA prohibiting
termination of continuation coverage where the preexisting secondary coverage ex-
cludes preexisting conditions emphasized "Congress' concern that group health plan
participants and their dependents not be placed in a situation in which they suffer a
gap in the character of coverage as the result of a 'qualifying event' such as termina-
tion of employment."45
The court cited the legislative history accompanying the 1989 amendment in
support of its interpretation.' According to the House Conference Report, a
beneficiary's eligibility for continuation coverage terminates upon the obtention of
other coverage unless the other coverage contains any exclusion or limitation with
respect to any preexisting condition of the qualified beneficiary. The House Report
explained that this exception was necessary in order to carry out the purpose of the
health insurance continuation rules, "which was to reduce the extent to which certain
events, such as the loss of one's job, could create a significant gap in health coverage.
Such a gap in coverage occurs when the new employer group health coverage excludes
or limits coverage for a preexisting condition that is covered by the continuation cover-
age."'47 Because Brock's preexisting coverage did not have a significant gap, she was
not entitled to continuation coverage.
38. 904 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1990).





44. Id. at 297.
45. Id. (citations omitted).
"46. Id.
47. H.R. REP. No. 247, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1452-53(1986), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1906, 2923.
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The Brock decision acknowledges that COBRA's goal is to ensure that the em-
ployee is actually covered under a plan. Applying this principle renders irrelevant the
time at which coverage is obtained. According to the Brock court, attention should
more properly be focused on whether there is a substantive rather than a temporal
difference in the two coverages.' So long as the preexisting coverage does not ex-
clude preexisting conditions, its existence should terminate the employer's obligation to
offer continuation coverage.49 In reaching this result, the court was faithful both to the
statutory language and to the purpose of the statute, which is to ensure coverage with-
out gaps for preexisting conditions.
The Eleventh Circuit decision in National Companies0 closely followed the
Brock analysis both in time and logic, with a more in-depth discussion of the "first
becomes, after the date of election" statutory language. In National Companies, the
qualified beneficiary, Robert Hersh, obtained individual health insurance coverage from
the National Distributing Company (NDC).5' His wife, who was employed by St.
Joseph's Hospital as a nurse, also obtained individual coverage from her employer.
Shortly before the birth of their first child, both Mr. and Mrs. Hersh sought family
coverage under their respective plans. Both Mr. and Mrs. Hersh's contracts with their
respective plans specified that the National Plan would be the primary insurer for Mr.
Hersh and their dependents while the St. Joseph's Plan would be the primary insurer
for Mrs. Hersh and a secondary insurer for Mr. Hersh and their dependents.52 The
two plans coordinated payments on the Hersh's claims based on this arrangement. 3
Four years after Mr. Hersh made this arrangement, he received a memorandum
from his employer articulating the employer's prerequisites for eligibility for COBRA
continuation coverage. 4 According to the memorandum, an employee's right to par-
ticipate in the plan would be terminated if the employee became "covered under anoth-
er group health plan."5 Shortly after this memorandum was disseminated, Mrs. Hersh
developed complications in her pregnancy. 6 At the same time, Mr. Hersh was con-
templating resigning his position in order to start his own business.57 Because of the
difficulties with Mrs. Hersh's pregnancy, the Hershes wanted to ensure that they could
retain dual-family health coverage even if Mr. Hersh left his job.58
Mr. Hersh resigned from his position in reliance on NDC's assurances that he
was eligible for continuation coverage and that NDC's plan would continue to cover
him even though he was also covered under the St. Joseph's plan.59 On his last day of
work, Mr. Hersh filled out election forms and a continuation coverage agreement.'
The coverage agreement Mr. Hersh signed used the obsolete pre-amendment language
indicating that Mr. Hersh would continue to receive COBRA coverage until he became
48. See generally Brock, 904 F.2d 295.
49. Id. at 297
50. 929 F.2d at 1558.
51. Id. at 1562.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1562 n.2.
54. Id. at 1562.
55. National Cos., 929 F.2d at 1558.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1563.
58. Id. at 1558.
59. Id.
60. National Cos., 929 F.2d at 1558.
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covered under another group health. plan because of either employment or remar-
riage."
Relying on the NDC administrators' opinion, Mr. Hersh paid premiums to con-
tinue his insurance coverage after his resignation.62 After thier twins were born, the
Hershes submitted claims to to the National plan and the St. Joseph's plan for coordi-
nation and payment. However, National denied coverage retroactively to the date of
Mr. Hersh's resignation and attempted to refund the Hershes' premiums on the ground
that Mr. Hersh was not entitled to coverage under the National Plan because he was
already covered under the St. Joseph's plan.63
National contended on appeal that it was not required to offer continuation cov-
erage to Mr. Hersh because he had preexisting coverage under his wife's plan. The
Court of Appeals agreed that National was not obligated to offer continuation coverage
to an employee who is covered under a preexisting group health plan.' After review-
ing the legislative history of COBRA, together with the Oakley and Brock holdings,
the court rejected the Brock court's conclusion that Oakley and Brock adopted the
same general rule, namely, that eligibility for continuation coverage under ERISA
depends on the character of the coverage. Instead, the court determined that Oakley
had held that preexisting coverage, regardless of its scope, had no effect on an
employee's right to continuation coverage.65 By contrast, according to the National
Companies court, Brock held that the opposite was true, assuming no significant gap in
coverage.' Thus, the National Companies court rejected the idea that the sympathetic
facts had driven the decision in Oakley.
Nevertheless, National Companies adopted the Brock analysis and rejected the
Oakley approach. The court noted that when Congress passed COBRA it had two con-
cerns in mind. On the one hand, it was concerned that employees who lost their jobs
would find they had no health insurance coverage.67 On the other hand, the court be-
lieved that Congress did not intend for continuation coverage to last forever, rather, it
should only last until the employee was able to obtain other coverage on her own.'
Requiring extended continuation coverage would be unfair to employers because it
would increase too greatly the operating cost of the employer's ERISA plan. Thus, the
court viewed its interpretive task as accommodating both Congress' interest in ensuring
that employees had insurance with its desire not to burden employers with financing
costly procedures.
Keeping the congressional goals in mind, the court found that the "first becomes,
after the date of election.., covered" language was not intended to limit the operation
of the termination provision to only those insurance coverage contracts acquired after
the date of election. Instead, the court reasoned that the language simply acknowledges
that COBRA continuation coverage does not begin and, therefore, cannot be terminated
before the election date simply because COBRA coverage does not exist at that
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1564.
64. Id. at 1566.
65. National Cos., 929 F.2d at 1569.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1569.
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time. 69 Because any continuation coverage would have to begin on the date of elec-
tion, where a terminated employee has preexisting coverage, the termination condition
is met contemporaneously with the election date. That is, the insured "first becomes,
after the date of election.., covered" on the date of election. According to the court, for
an employee with preexisting group health coverage, "the terminating event occurs
immediately; the first time after the election date that the employee becomes covered
by a group health plan other than the employer's plan is the moment after the election
date. In effect, such an employee is ineligible for continuation coverage."70
The court concluded that because Mr. Hersh was covered by his wife's plan,
National was not under a statutory obligation to offer him continuation coverage. This
finding is consistent with the congressional purpose underlying the statute, ensuring
single, not double, coverage. The court did acknowledge that a significant gap between
the coverage under the National plan and the St. Joseph's plan would have rendered
Mr. Hersh eligible for continuation coverage.7 The court reasoned that where a sig-
nificant gap exists, the terminated employee is not "truly 'covered' by the preexisting
1172group health plan, as that term is used by Congress to effectuate its intent ....
Although the Hershes were personally responsible for $6,700 worth of medical expens-
es, the court found that because this was not the result of a significant coverage gap,
the National plan was not responsible for covering it.73
One might have thought that on the strength of the Brock and National Compa-
nies cases and because Oakley was decided before the 1989 amendment was enacted,
subsequent courts would be more apt to conclude that preexisting coverage barred
obtention of continuation coverage. But the Seventh Circuit, in a surprising decision,
held that preexisting coverage does not render an employee ineligible for continuation
coverage under COBRA. In Lutheran Hospital v. Business Men's Assurance Co.,74
the Seventh Circuit was confronted by the same question at issue in National Com-
panies: who among Mrs. Isch (the employee), and two insurers, should bear the cost of
Mrs. Isch's hospital services. The answer to the question turned once again on whether
the "first becomes, after the date of election... covered" language of Section
1162(2)(D)(i) authorized an employer to terminate a former employee's eligibility for
continuation coverage under COBRA.
In Lutheran Hospital, Mrs. Isch was laid off from her job with Community and
Family Services, Inc..75 Layoffs, like terminations, trigger the continuation coverage
provisions of COBRA.76 At the time of her layoff, Mrs. Isch's husband received
group health insurance through the Teamsters Local 135 Welfare Fund. The Teamsters
plan covered Mrs. Isch as a dependent.77
Prior to her layoff, Mrs. Isch was hospitalized with a serious medical condition.
Her hospitalization continued for many months. Community's prior group insurer paid
69. Id.
70. National Cos., 929 F.2d at 1570.
71. Id. at 1571.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. 51 F.3d at 1308.
75. Id. at 1310.
76. Qualifying events triggering COBRA coverage include "reduction of hours" or lay-offs. 29
U.S.C. § 1163 (1994).
77. Lutheran Hosp., 51 F.3d at 1310.
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those medical expenses incurred for the first six days after Mrs. Isch's layoff, but re-
fused to pay any bills for medical care received after that time. The Teamsters plan
also refused to cover Mrs. Isch's expenses, claiming that Community's group health
plan should provide primary coverage. The Teamsters plan admitted that it had no
limitations or exclusions for the plaintiff's preexisting conditions. Therefore, the Team-
sters plan would be liable for Mrs. Isch's bills if Community's insurer was not.
The lower court ruled that Mrs. Isch's coverage under the Teamsters plan satis-
fied the termination condition for COBRA continuation coverage.78 The Seventh Cir-
cuit reversed, drawing a sharp distinction between preexisting and after-acquired health
insurance coverage. Under the Seventh Circuit's reasoning, preexisting coverage can
never serve to trigger the COBRA termination condition even when, as in Lutheran
Hospital, the result would be dual coverage.
The Seventh Circuit first examined the statutory language, finding that the "first
becomes, after the date of election... covered" language meant that an employee with
preexisting coverage at the time of the qualifying event is nevertheless eligible for
continuation coverage.79 The court said that only if the employee chose to accept cov-
erage from another plan some time beyond the election date could the employer termi-
nate continuation coverage." According to the Seventh Circuit, the goal of the statute
was preservation of the employee's health care status quo from the employee's per-
spective.8 Therefore, if the employee wishes to maintain dual coverage even where
there is no significant gap between the two policies, that choice belongs to the employ-
ee.
The Seventh Circuit emphasized throughout its opinion that COBRA was intend-
ed to provide an employee a choice between COBRA continuation coverage and preex-
isting coverage. According to the court, "[b]y the terms of the statute, the individual
has the choice whether to preserve the status quo and continue the prior level of cover-
age under COBRA or accept alternative coverage and discontinue coverage [under
COBRA." '82 In the court's view, it was unfair to prohibit an employee who main-
tained secondary or additional coverage prior to his termination from participating in
COBRA because the employee's decision to add coverage or maintain secondary cov-
erage was not a "choice". The court suggests that when an employee obtains coverage
in addition to that provided by his employer, he may not have considered that this
secondary coverage might ultimately become his primary coverage should he lose his
job. Because he may not have considered this ultimate consequence, he should not be
bound by the selection. Indeed, according to the Seventh Circuit, only if he chooses to
stay with the other coverage after the date of election should he be bound by his
"choice".
The Seventh Circuit's approach to interpretation of this statute works to render
one COBRA notification provision meaningless. Under COBRA, all employer-adminis-
tered group health plans must include a "commencement of coverage" provision which
must state that obtention of another policy prior to a qualifying event will render the
employee ineligible to participate in the COBRA election.83 The Seventh Circuit's
78. Id. at 1310-11.




83. 29 U.S.C. § 1166(a)(1) (1994). See, e.g., ExclusiCare Subscription Agreement and Schedule of
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analysis rewards employees who fail to read this provision of their insurance with dual
coverage under the theory that these employees were not actually aware that maintain-
ing an additional policy would terminate their right to receive COBRA benefits.
Though it may be unfortunate that employees who fail to read their policies lose the
right to continuation coverage, in order to give the commencement of coverage provi-
sion meaning, those employees must be held responsible for what appears in their
insurance policy.
Moreover, holding employees to the terms of their insurance contracts comports
with recent judicial decisions. In most recent cases, courts have held employees re-
sponsible for knowing the effect of the language that appears in contracts with their
employers or others, even if they were not fully cognizant of the consequences of the
agreement.8 4 Yet, in Lutheran Hospital, the court departs from that approach, confer-
ring COBRA rights on employees who failed either to read or understand the insurance
policy they received when they were hired. For the Seventh Circuit's analysis to be
correct, one would have to assume that the requirement that employers notify employ-
ees of their COBRA rights at the time they are hired is meaningless and that insurance
policies are adhesion contracts and therefore void ab initio. Yet the provisions of such
agreements are routinely enforced, and so the court's position on the continuation pro-
vision seems untenable.
Although the court's approach is inconsistent with another part of the statute and
is contrary to the recent trend in case law, the court emphasized that both the clear
language of the statute as well as the statute's purpose supported its conclusion. Ac-
cording to the court, the "plain language" of the statute "dictates that an individual
only loses COBRA eligibility if he or she chooses to accept alternative group health
insurance after the qualifying event."85 This interpretation of the language is consis-
tent with the Seventh Circuit's vision of the purpose of COBRA, which is to protect
the beneficiary's health care "status quo," ensuring that "the individual is never forced
to accept a lower level of health care coverage than he or she received as an employee
before the qualifying event. '
The court's analysis did not end there. It also cited additional language from
Section 1162 of the COBRA statute as well as the Treasury Department's proposed
COBRA regulations in support of its theory that Congress had intended to require
more than "bare-bones" continuation coverage.87 Section 1162(1) declares that contin-
uation coverage offered to qualified beneficiaries must be identical to the continuation
coverage that is provided to similarly-situated beneficiaries under the plan whose em-
ployment has not been terminated. 8 The proposed treasury regulations require that an
employer who offers existing employees the opportunity to participate in a cafeteria
Benefits at 30 (1994) (on file with author). The Exclusicare Agreement states, "[a] covered person's
continued Health Coverage will end at midnight on the earliest of .... (c) the day a covered person
is covered under group coverage as an employee or otherwise."
84. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (Supreme Court, in enforcing
arbitration agreement signed by employee at time of hire, rejects argument that employee was not fully
cognizant of risks present in the proposed arbitral agreement); Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, 971
F.2d 698 (11th Cir. 1992) (same); Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932 (1992)
(same).
85. Lutheran Hosp., 51 F.3d at 1312.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1313.
88. 29 U.S.C. § 1162(1) (1994).
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plan, which allows an employee to choose among several group health plans, must
afford COBRA beneficiaries the same opportunity to participate. 9 The proposed regu-
lations also suggest that an employee who participates in the employer's separate vi-
sion and dental plans may opt to continue coverage under these plans despite the oc-
currence of a qualifying event.
The Seventh Circuit reasons that, because COBRA beneficiaries must be offered
the same opportunities as similarly situated employees who have not suffered a quali-
fying event, the goal of COBRA must be to maintain the employee's health care status
quo.' ° In fact, the idea underlying the statutory language and the proposed regulations
is simply that as long as the ex-employees and the current employees are covered un-
der the same plan, the employer cannot treat former employees worse than it treats
current employees. That an employer may not reduce coverage for former employees
under COBRA while maintaining coverage for current employees does not change the
fact that continuation coverage is limited in time and may be terminated prematurely
upon the occurrence of certain events. Indeed, prohibiting an employer from discrimi-
nating against former employees does not change COBRA from a statute intended to
assure that former employees maintain some insurance coverage to one that maintains
an employee's health care status quo. After all, there is nothing to prevent the employ-
er from reducing coverage for current employees and then reducing it for COBRA
beneficiaries as well. Thus, the Seventh Circuit's reliance on the proposed treasury
regulations and Section 1162(1) is misplaced.
In fact, had the court examined the proposed regulations in their entirety, it
would have discovered that the regulations actually undermine rather than support its
position. Proposed Treasury Regulation 38 advises that the phrase "first becomes, after
the date of election.., covered" should be interpreted to end continuation coverage
under COBRA when the qualified beneficiary is covered (i.e., actually covered, rather
than merely eligible to be covered) under any other group health plan that is not main-
tained by the employer, even if that coverage is less valuable to the qualified benefi-
ciary than COBRA continuation coverage. 9'
Whether the proposed treasury regulation provides a definitive answer to the
interpretive question is another issue altogether. It is well-understood that an adminis-
trative agency's contemporaneous construction of a statute it is charged with adminis-
tering should be followed absent compelling indications that it is wrong.92 Further, if
one were to follow the IRS's contemporaneous interpretation of the COBRA statute,
then the conclusion that Congress did not intend to require employers to provide con-
tinuation coverage to qualified beneficiaries who are covered by another group health
plan would be inescapable.
Despite the Seventh Circuit's conclusion to the contrary, however, proposed
regulations may not be the best source for determining Congressional intent.93 While
89. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-26, 52 Fed. Reg. 22716, 22723 (1987).
90. Lutheran Hosp., 51 F.3d at 1313.
91. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-26, 52 Fed. Reg. 22716, 22730 (1987); Martin v. Prudential Ins.
Co., 776 F.Supp. 1172, 1177 n.9 (1991).
92. E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46, 55 (1977); United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
93. At best, examination of proposed regulations may assist in the determination of agency, not
Congressional, intent. The question at that point becomes whether Congress intended that the courts
follow the agency's interpretation.
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some courts do use proposed regulations in this way,94 a great debate over the degree
to which a court should defer to proposed regulations remains unresolved.9 As the
Sixth Circuit observed in Ohio State University v. Secretary, "the degree to which
courts are bound by agency interpretations of law has been like quicksand. The stan-
dard has been constantly shifting, steadily sinking, and, from the perspective of the
intermediate appellate courts, frustrating." '96 The proposed treasury regulations have
been used frequently and interpreted in a fairly consistent manner since their introduc-
tion in 1988. Yet, the IRS has failed to finalize them and label them as interpretive
regulations.97 While it seems, then, that the regulations may provide some guidance to
courts, it would probably be unwise to hold that they are the final word on the mean-
ing of the statute.9"
In practical effect, then, Lutheran Hospital revives an interpretive dilemma that
might otherwise have laid dormant following the Brock and National Companies deci-
sions. Unless reconsidered or altered through legislation, insurance companies and
employers alike will continue to be confronted by the problem of how to treat termi-
nated employees who have preexisting insurance coverage. In order to guide the final
resolution of this issue, it is a useful exercise to consider which approach is most in
keeping with the purpose and language of Section 1162 of COBRA. Part II suggests
that lower courts would act with greater fidelity to COBRA and ERISA and general
principles of statutory interpretation if they adopted the position that Section 1162 does
not require employers to offer continuation coverage to employees who maintain pre-
existing coverage, assuming that no significant gaps in coverage exist.
94. See Branch v. G. Bernd Co., 955 F.2d 1574, 1581 (11th Cir. 1992) (finding that the proposed
regulations "represent the proper construction of COBRA in light of Congress' intent"); Lincoln Gener-
al Hosp. v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Neb., 963 F.2d 1136, 1142 (8th Cir. 1992) (proposed regula-
tions show "regular practice" under COBRA); Lutheran Hosp., 51 F.3d at 1313.
95. See Oakley, 890 F.2d at 1128.
96. Ohio State Univ. v. Secretary, 996 F.2d 122, 123 n.1 (6th Cir. 1993).
97. Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 618 F.2d 1029, 1036 n. 10 (4th Cir. 1980); Teweleit v. Hartford
Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 43 F.3d 1005, 1009 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that because Proposed Regulations
s. 1.162-26 were never formally adopted they have no precedential authority). The purpose of the
typical interpretive rule is to interpret or clarify the nature of duties a previously enacted statute creat-
ed. See General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 724 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Unlike legislative rules,
which must go through notice and comment procedures, an interpretive rule or regulation is not con-
trolling on a court. Although such rules lack the power to control, courts may look to interpretive
rules for guidance. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
98. But see Gaskell v. Harvard Cooperative Society, 3 F.3d 495, 500 (Ist Cir. 1993) (stating that
"pending promulgation of final regulations, the Internal Revenue Service . . . consider[s] compliance
with the terms of these proposed regulations to constitute good faith compliance with a reasonable
interpretation of the statutory requirements.") (citations omitted).
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II. METHODS OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THEIR
APPLICATION TO THE PROBLEM AT HAND
The judicial goal in matters of statutory interpretation is, in general, to give ef-
fect to the expressed intent of Congress.' To determine what Congress intended,
courts traditionally start with, and, for the most part, end with, the "plain language of
the statute."'" The trouble arises when the scope of the statute is broad enough to
encompass the subject matter of the interpretive question but the statutory language
fails to address it. Where Congress has failed to anticipate the question when drafting
the statutory language or the language is open to more than one fair interpretation, it is
unclear how judges are to proceed. Some judges take this opportunity to manipulate
the language of the statute in order to impose their own will. Other judges, including a
number of Supreme Court justices, proceed by examining the text's surrounding con-
text and structure.' Judges' consideration of context leads them in some cases to ex-
amine not simply the structure of the statute, but also the interpretations of the same
language in other statutes and the canons of statutory construction. If the contextual
analysis fails, judges may turn to the legislative history of the statute for further eluci-
dation."° While Congress has endorsed none of these approaches," 3 the idea that
judges should focus on the text, its context and the statute's structure in order to re-
duce judicial discretion, preventing judges from becoming the "real authors of the rule"
99. According to Hart and Sacks, the "golden rule" of statutory interpretation states that the
judge's sole task is "to declare the expressed intention of the Legislature, even if that intention appears
to the court injudicious ...." Henry Hart and Albert Sacks, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1144 (10th ed. 1958); William N. Eskridge, The New
Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621, 623 (1990) (suggesting that the Supreme Court views its only role
in interpreting a statute "is to divine the intent of Congress."); Charles P. Curtis, A Better Theory of
Legal Interpretation, 3 VAND. L. REv. 407 (1950) (stating that the general approach to interpretation
"consists essentially in a search for the intention of the author."); Commissioner v. Engle, 464 U.S.
206, 214 (1984); Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, (1982) (stating that the intentions
of the drafters of the laws "must be controlling."); Lutheran Hosp., 51 F.3d at 1313. As with so many
other issues in statutory interpretation, not all scholars and judges agree that the goal of the courts is
to effectuate Congress' intent. One might suggest that it is impossible to glean a single intent out of
Congress because it is comprised of a large group of people with diverse interests. Nevertheless, it
appears that most judges use the term "intent" as a starting point in their search for the meaning of a
particular statutory word or phrase.
100. Lutheran Hosp., 51 F.3d at 1312.
101. William N. Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990). See Herrmann v.
Cencom Cable Associates, Inc., 978 F.2d 978, 983 (7th Cir. 1992).
102. But See Note, Why Learned Hand Would Never Consult Legislative History Today, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 1005 (1992); Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539, 1559 (9th Cir. 1986) (Kozinski, J.,
concurring) (stating that the use of legislative history "creates strong incentives for manipulating legis-
lative history to achieve through the courts results not achievable during the enactment process."). The
"new textualists", like Justice Scalia, would be reluctant to consider legislative history even if other
interpretive methods failed. Under the strict textualist approach, legislative history should only be con-
sidered in those rare cases where the language of the statute would lead to absurd results. See
Eskridge, supra note 101 at 651.
103. On occasion, Congress has included clauses mandating that the language of a statute be liber-
ally or strictly construed. See Note, Interpretive Directions in Statutes, 31 HARv. J. LEGis. 211, 215-16
(1994) (listing statutes that contain clauses requiring that the statute be either liberally or strictly con-
strued). One unanswered question is whether Congress could pass a general interpretive law stating that
a particular method should be used to interpret certain statutes. Such an approach would likely be
unconstitutional because it destroys the concept of separation of powers. Under the separation of pow-
ers theory, Congress' job is to state what a particular law means. The judiciary's job is to declare
how statutes should generally be interpreted.
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is currently in vogue.'
To answer the question contemplated in this article, whether the "first becomes,
after the date of election, covered" language requires a distinction between preexisting
and after-acquired coverage, then, one must first consider whether the plain meaning of
this language can be determined. If not, additional tools of statutory interpretation must
be considered and applied, including, perhaps, legislative history.
A. Plain Language Interpretation
A strict plain meaning or "textualist"' 5 approach to statutory interpretation pos-
its that most interpretation questions can be resolved by applying the plain meaning of
the statutory language."° This plain meaning approach emphasizes that where the
plain language is sufficiently clear, other sources of meaning should not be considered.
Textualists are driven by the fear that resort to other sources for interpretation, particu-
larly legislative history, will enable the courts to do an end-run around the constitution-
ally-imposed method of bill creation by allowing the views of individual legislators to
carry the day. 7 While it may be proper to consider the plain language of the statute
first because the statutory text represents the choices of the democratically elected
legislature and therefore best represents the views of the electorate,' the inherent
problem with this approach is that the significance of the congressional enactment
often cannot be determined without resort to background understandings regarding
what words mean and consideration of the context or surrounding structure in which
those words appear." As Judge Easterbrook emphasizes, "[w]ords are arbitrary
104. Herrmann v. Cencom Cable Assoc. Inc., 978 F.2d at 978.
105. One might argue that it is disingenuous to use the terms "plain meaning" and "textualist"
interchangeably. According to Professor William Eskridge, among others, current textualists approach
statutory text slightly differently than those using the plain meaning approach. A textualist, such as
Justice Scalia, is quicker to find plain meaning in the text and less receptive to the use of non-textual
interpretative tools, particularly legislative history. See Eskridge, supra note 101, at 645-55.
106. William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES
AND THE CREATION OF PUBLic POLICY 571 (1988) [herinafter Legislation]; But see Frank H.
Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y.
61, 67 (1993) ("[pllain meaning as a way to understand language is silly.") [hereinafter Easterbrook].
107. Central States Pension Fund v. Lady Baltimore Foods, Inc., 960 F.2d 1339, 1346 (7th Cir.
1992).
108. Cass Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. REv. 405, 416
(1989). [hereinafter Sunstein] Professor Sunstein's approach to plain language is based on his belief
that the Framers wanted government to adopt a "public-seeking vision" when drafting statutes. This
baseline presumes that the legislature is acting in the interest of its constituents at all times and that
courts should presume as much when interpreting statutes. Public choice theorists reject this argument
largely because it is too idealistic. See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-4n the Classroom
and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 800 (1983). Judge Posner suggests that a more realistic
analysis of the legislative process would take into consideration that many laws represent compromises
and may not reflect the desires of Congress, much less that of the constituents. Thus, a judge inter-
preting a statute should not assume that legislators act responsibly or in the interest of their constitu-
ents. Rather, a judge interpreting a statute should try to put himself in the "shoes of the enacting
legislators and figure out how they would have wanted the statute applied to the case before him." Id.
at 286. This "imaginative reconstruction" requires consideration of what actually transpires at the time
of the law's enactment including, among other things, compromises among legislators with respect to
statutory language.
109. See Herrmann, 978 F.2d at 982 (where Judge Easterbrook, writing for the majority, noted that
"[silicing a statute into phrases while ignoring their contexts-the surrounding words, the setting of the
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signs, having meaning only to the extent writers and readers share an understanding. A
mark such as 1" has a meaning without language, but 'up' must be decoded according
to rules and cultural norms."' 0
Were the textualist strategy the only alternative, its major conceptual limitation,
that statutory language rarely admits a single plain meaning, would more than occa-
sionally lead to result-oriented analysis. After all, "one person's ambiguity is another's
plain meaning."''. Where no plain meaning". can be discerned, some jurispruden-
tial theory of meaning must be applied to provide meaningful restraints on what other-
wise might become the unfettered exercise of judicial will. In other words, if the statu-
tory language does not clearly resolve the dispute, consideration of other interpretive
tools may provide an interpretation that more closely resembles what Congress would
have wanted" 3 or, at the least, what seems more in keeping with the underlying pur-
pose of the statute.
Congress never anticipated the problems associated with applying the plain lan-
guage of COBRA Section 1162(2)(D)(i) to beneficiaries who maintain preexisting
coverage when COBRA was drafted. Nevertheless, both sides suggest that the "plain
meaning" of the statute supports their respective interpretation. One side suggests that
the inclusion of the "after the date of election" language simply acknowledges that
COBRA continuation coverage cannot be terminated before the date of election of
COBRA because at that point, the option to elect COBRA does not exist. Once the
option to elect COBRA matures, the only relevant question is when the other coverage
takes effect. In the case of preexisting coverage, the event terminating the right to
continue occurs immediately; that is, the first moment after the election date that the
employee becomes covered by another group health plan is the moment after the elec-
tion date. Because another plan instantaneously covers him, the employee is rendered
ineligible for COBRA continuation coverage. The focus, under this reading of the
statute, is on whether a policy actually covers the former employee. If the employee is
covered, regardless of when he received the other coverage, he is not entitled to CO-
BRA benefits."
4
enactment, the function a phrase serves in the statutory structure-is a formula for disaster."); Sunstein,
supra note 108, at 495 (in which Professor Sunstein contends that even in easy cases, the plain lan-
guage alone may be insufficient as a means for interpretation, and that resort to background principles
may be necessary); See Legislation supra note 106.
110. Herrmann, 978 F.2d at 982.
111. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reconsidering the Employment Contract Exclusion in Section 1 of the
Federal Arbitration Act: Correcting the Judiciary's Failure of Statutory Vision, 1991 J. DisP. REs. 280
(1991) [herinafter Stemple].
112. Justice Scalia, among others, has argued that he can find plain meaning in most statutes.
Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DuKE L. J. 511. Of
course, his plain meaning may not be another judge's plain meaning. Therein lies the problem. Be-
cause interpretations of plain meaning are largely driven by the interpreters' pre-conceptions, where
plain meaning is not obvious, it is reasonable to consider whether other statutory tools may elucidate
the true "plain" meaning of the statute.
113. Many scholars would disagree that the goal of statutory interpretation is to determine what
Congress would have "wanted". The idea that a collection of individuals can actually "want" something
as a group is a fiction. Obviously, various members of Congress have certain objectives. Yet it is not
clear that those objectives can be added together to obtain a meaningful intent. If the language fails to
address the interpretive question, the court must nevertheless provide an answer. Still the most popular
way of determining the answer is to consider Congressional intent as it is articulated through the lan-
guage, context and structure of the statute.
114. A judicial exception to this rule has been created. If the alternate coverage contains a "signifi-
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The opposing argument, that preexisting coverage does not trigger COBRA's
termination provision, focuses on Congress's use of the statutory words "first be-
comes." According to the dictionary, "becomes" means "to come to be" or "to devel-
op," implying some variation in the actor's status. Proponents of the Seventh and
Tenth Circuit's approach contend that a change in status does not occur if, after the
date of election, the beneficiary maintains the same level of insurance coverage as he
did the day before the election. A change in status sufficient to trigger the termination
condition occurs only if the new coverage is acquired after the date of election, so the
beneficiary now owns something he did not previously own. Under this "dictionary
definition" theory, coverage that exists on the date when the employee may elect con-
tinuation coverage does not terminate an employee's right to continuation coverage.
In light of these different interpretations of the plain meaning of the phrase "first
becomes, after the date of election... covered," the only obvious conclusion is that the
phrase has no "plain" meaning. Because Congress adopted this statute with inadequate
appreciation for this interpretation problem, a method of resolving the dispute is to
apply interpretive tools to assist courts in choosing the better of the two interpretations.
Where statutory language is unclear and Congress has failed to provide interpre-
tive directions, however, there is little consensus as to which interpretive rules and
processes should be applied. The inability of scholars to agree on a unifying theory of
legislation has not prevented the promulgation of a variety of theoretical approaches to
statutory interpretation. Together with textualism, both the legal process approach and
the intentionalism school have received some level of general acceptance among schol-
ars and judges."5 Although these schools of thought differ in their emphasis on the
significance of particular interpretive factors, application of each to the problem at
hand yields the same result - that preexisting coverage should void the right of a for-
mer employee to obtain continuation coverage from his employer.
One of the primary methods of statutory interpretation is the "legal process"
method developed by Henry Hart and Albert Sacks almost 50 years ago. The legal
process approach takes the position that where the plain language of the statute fails to
answer the interpretive question, the preferred interpretation is the one that advances
the "purpose" of the statute. "'6 In cases where alternate approaches exist, the legal
process approach dictates that the court choose the one that best effectuates the
statute's purpose.
The first task of a court applying the legal process approach is to infer the
statute's purpose. To deduce purpose, the court's focus should not be on discerning the
legislature's intent, but rather on "decid[ing] what meaning ought to be given to the
directions of the statute in the respects relevant to the case before it.""' 7 In determin-
ing the meaning of the words, the court may not consider the impact that interest
groups wield in the legislative process,"' nor may it consider the pressures that fre-
quently come to bear on legislators who must satisfy interest groups if they are to
cant" gap in coverage, the qualified beneficiary will be entitled to COBRA continuation coverage. 29
U.S.C. § 1162(2)(D) (1994).
115. See Stempel, supra note III at 280.
116. See Hart & Sacks supra note 99 at 1156.




remain in power." 9 Instead, the court must apply the presumption that those engaged
in law making are at all times trying to act responsibly and reasonably in discharging
their obligations. 2 ° The logic underlying this presumption is that the law itself is ra-
tional and any interpretation of law must be consistent with the overall legal frame-
work. To best ensure that statutes receive a rational interpretation, Hart and Sacks
suggest that a court attribute a public-minded purpose to the legislators who enact the
laws.
The results of an application of the legal process approach to the problem at
hand depends on the purpose of the COBRA legislation. The underlying goal of CO-
BRA is to provide health insurance to people who have lost their jobs and would be
without health insurance if not for the COBRA coverage. In other words, COBRA's
purpose is to ensure seamless coverage for all working Americans. But COBRA's
purpose does not extend to mandating permanent health insurance coverage for an
indefinite period of time. COBRA protection is limited, terminating as early as 18
months after the date of election, or earlier if certain terminating conditions are met.
Thus, the COBRA statute works as "bridge" coverage, giving the employee coverage
only for the period of time the government has discerned it should take the former
employee to find replacement coverage. 2 '
Once it is recognized that COBRA's purpose is to provide temporary insurance
relief to those who have lost jobs, the question then becomes: to what amount of insur-
ance coverage is the qualified beneficiary entitled? If the purpose of COBRA is to
ensure that a terminated employee receives the same amount and type of insurance that
he received prior to termination, then an interpretation that allows him to maintain his
current level of insurance is preferable to one that results in a change in the amount of
insurance to which he is entitled. On the other hand, if the purpose of COBRA is to
insure that a qualified beneficiary has some insurance coverage, an interpretation that
is limited to insuring that the former employee enjoys seamless single coverage would
be more appropriate.
One way to determine which expression of purpose is correct is to examine how
qualified beneficiaries who obtain alternate coverage after the date of election are treat-
ed. COBRA insures that qualified beneficiaries enjoy continuation coverage after the
date of election until some terminating event occurs. Thus, COBRA confers upon qual-
ified beneficiaries a fight to coverage at all times, but not double coverage. Assuming
that legislators are reasonable people acting reasonably, one might surmise that Con-
gress would want to treat qualified beneficiaries with preexisting coverage the same as
those with after-acquired coverage. Reasonable legislators would be unlikely to dis-
criminate among the beneficiaries of the statute. Thus, if beneficiaries who obtain
alternate coverage after the date of election are never entitled to double coverage, then
neither should beneficiaries with preexisting coverage be entitled to double coverage.
To determine how to treat beneficiaries with preexisting coverage, then, it is
worth considering how the termination rules apply to a qualified beneficiary who ob-
tains alternate coverage after the date of election. After the date of election, a qualified
beneficiary may lose his right to continuation coverage if he remarries, is employed or
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1415.
121. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Tex., Inc. v. Shalala, 995 F.2d 70, 71 (5th Cir. 1993).
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otherwise becomes covered. Thus, a beneficiary who obtains new employment and
accepts his new employer's offer of health insurance loses his right to COBRA contin-
uation coverage even if the new employer's health insurance policy is not as good as
the COBRA employer's policy. Similarly, if the beneficiary remarries, and his spouse
names him as a dependent under her coverage, he becomes ineligible for continuation
coverage even if the new policy provides less coverage. Under those circumstances,
courts universally agree that a COBRA employer may discontinue coverage even
though the beneficiary now maintains a lower level of coverage.
The universal acceptance of this interpretation is primarily based on the supposi-
tion that the employee "voluntarily and knowingly" relinquished his right to continua-
tion coverage. The question, then, is whether obtaining alternate coverage prior to a
beneficiary's termination should be treated as a voluntary and knowing relinquishment
of his continuation rights when he obtains alternate coverage that is equal to, better
than, or worse than the continuation coverage. Those courts that have chosen to treat
this situation differently appear to base the distinction on the belief that the
beneficiary's choice of alternate coverage was neither knowing nor voluntary. Under
this view, the court may be assuming that the beneficiary was unaware that he was
covered as a dependent under his spouse's policy, that he was not aware that the alter-
nate policy could become the primary policy if his employment were terminated, or
that the beneficiary is incapable of properly assessing the risk that he will be terminat-
ed and that termination will result in loss of coverage if he holds another policy.
Yet this interpretation, which would allow a beneficiary to retain both his preex-
isting coverage and continuation coverage, is inconsistent with the treatment of a quali-
fied beneficiary who remarries following the date of election and becomes covered as
a dependent under his new spouse's policy. It is the rare employee who would be
aware that remarriage after the date of election would result in loss of his continuation
coverage just as it is the rare employee who would think that his status as a dependent
under his spouse's coverage while he is still employed might result in his ineligibility
for COBRA should he suffer a qualifying event. Yet, courts unquestioningly accept the
proposition that remarriage terminates one's right to COBRA. To interpret the statute
differently simply because the beneficiary was still employed when he became a de-
pendent would be both inequitable and inconsistent.
The only way to justify such inconsistent treatment is to presume that COBRA is
protectionist legislation. Under this view, the drafters of COBRA would presume that
employees who become dependents under other coverage while still employed are not
capable of voluntarily relinquishing their rights to COBRA, perhaps because they are,
as yet, unaware of those rights. Former employees, newly informed of their COBRA
rights, by contrast, are deemed to relinquish those rights voluntarily upon remarriage or
reemployment. Were it not for the provision that allows one's rights to be terminated
upon remarriage, this argument would have much to recommend it. But because one's
decision to remarry rarely, if ever, is dependent on the awareness that such an event
will result in ineligibility for COBRA, it does not make sense to attribute knowing and
voluntary action to a former employee getting remarried while treating an employee
prior to discharge as unaware that he is a dependent under his spouse's policy.
Moreover, it is unclear whether an employee's knowledge of his COBRA rights,
particularly the termination upon remarriage provision, would be any greater after his
termination than prior to it. One might argue that the notification provisions of CO-
BRA draw to the former employee's attention his rights and obligations under COBRA
19961
Journal of Legislation
and that any subsequent action the employee engages in is undertaken with the aware-
ness of these obligations. The employee should, however, already be aware of these
rights. By law, all employers offering group health plans must provide written notice
to each covered employee of his or her continuation coverage rights at the commence-
ment of coverage.'22 If a court is willing to hold an employee to what he reads in the
COBRA notification provision, it would seem logical to hold the employee responsible
for information contained in his insurance policy.
Consequently, courts should only construe the language of the statute to ensure
single coverage. A reading of the statutory language that distinguished between preex-
isting and after-acquired coverage would be inconsistent with the statute's careful bal-
ance between the interest in ensuring that beneficiaries receive insurance coverage and
the interest in not overburdening employers. This balance is exemplified by the treat-
ment qualified beneficiaries receive when they remarry or become employed after the
date of election. Under those circumstances, the beneficiary's right to continuation
coverage is summarily ended regardless of the quality of the alternate coverage. Under
these circumstances, the statute's purpose is served because the beneficiary has main-
tained seamless single coverage. Acting reasonably, Congress would have wanted the
statute to work the same way for beneficiaries with preexisting coverage. After all,
Congress mandated that employees be notified at the commencement of coverage of
their COBRA rights. Moreover, employees with preexisting coverage should be aware
that they have preexisting coverage, as is a beneficiary after the date of election who
marries someone who names him as a dependent under her policy, thus ending his
COBRA eligibility. This interpretation manifests the congressional intent that COBRA
is a transitional benefit designed to ensure only that a beneficiary whose employment
terminates will not be without any (or comparable) health insurance for a limited peri-
od while he seeks new coverage.
B. Intentionalism
Another major school of statutory construction suggests that the meaning of a
statute should be determined by ascertaining the intent of the legislature enacting the
statute.'23 Although similar to the legal process method in some respects, the
intentionalist approach differs in that it typically involves examination not only of the
text of the statute but also consideration of how the enacting legislature would have re-
solved the particular interpretive question. Because the focus of such an inquiry is on
the enacting legislature's intent, resort to extrinsic aids, particularly legislative history,
is commonplace.'24
Putting aside the question whether consideration of legislative intent and legisla-
tive history is an appropriate judicial endeavor," consideration of COBRA's legisla-
122. 29 U.S.C. § 1166(a)(1) (1994).
123. Sunstein, supra note 108 at 428.
124. Id. at 429.
125. Scholars and judges are clearly divided over the propriety of using legislative history to deter-
mine statutory meaning. See Sunstein, supra note 108, at 429. See also Easterbrook, supra note 106 at
68. Those scholars who criticize the use of legislative history rest their argument primarily on their
view that it is impossible to determine Congressional intent by examining committee reports, floor
debates and the like. Considering the volume of legislation Congress passes each year, it does stretch
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tive history'26 offers further clarification of COBRA's purpose and lends support to
the theory that COBRA was adopted as a remedy designed to resolve a temporary
problem. The House Committee Report accompanying COBRA states that COBRA
was intended to serve as a response to "reports of the growing number of Americans
without any health insurance coverage and the decreasing willingness of our Nation's
hospitals to provide care to those who cannot afford to pay."' 27 The Report implies
that the focus of the statute should be on those individuals who would have no health
insurance at all following the occurrence of a qualifying event, not on those employees
who have managed to obtain alternate coverage. 8
The Report also emphasized that it was imposing the costs of insuring former
employees on employers in order to avoid increasing the "staggering budget deficits
now facing the United States."' 29 Recognizing the substantial financial burden this
imposes on the employers, the Report makes clear that employees' interest in contin-
ued health care should be balanced against employers' property rights. Thus, not all
former employees will have "continued access to affordable private health insur-
ance." '" Only those former employees who have undergone a qualifying event will
be able to purchase health insurance, and then only for a limited time and under partic-
ular circumstances.
The legislative history of the amendment to Section 1162(2)(D)(i), which limits
termination of continuation coverage where a preexisting condition exists, further sup-
ports the idea that continuation coverage is limited in time and scope. According to the
House Committee Report to the amendment, the purpose of the health care continua-
tion rules is to "reduce the extent to which certain events, such as the loss of one's
job, could create a significant gap in coverage."'' By emphasizing that significant
gaps are not allowed, the Report implies that gaps of a lesser nature will be permitted.
Had Congress wished to forbid termination of the right to continuation coverage except
where coverage was identical, it certainly could have done so.
Discussion of the legislative views of Section 1162(2)(D)(i) is necessarily specu-
the imagination to suppose that every member of Congress has read every committee report or attend-
ed each floor debate. Thus, it seems unlikely that the legislative history represents the views of the
legislature. Perhaps even more problematic is that the legislative history is "frequently written by well-
organized private groups," thus reflecting little general congressional intent. See Sunstein, supra note
108, at 429. Justice Scalia suggests that using legislative history to interpret statutory language ends up
increasing the power of private interest groups at the expense of the constituents for whom the legis-
lation was passed.
According to proponents of the use of legislative history, however, legislative history may help a
court in determining the statute's purpose and provide the needed context within which a court may
interpret the statutory language at issue. Sunstein, Id. at 430. Professor Sunstein suggests that, at the
least, legislative history provides judges somewhere to look for meaning. In his view, judges who are
unwilling to consider legislative history are more likely to impose their own views on what the statute
means. Sunstein, supra note 108 at 430. In such a situation, in his view, the remedy is more danger-
ous than the disease.
126. A number of courts mention that the paucity of COBRA legislative history of COBRA is a
consequence of its inclusion in the Budget Reconciliation Act.









lative because of the limited legislative history of the provision." As a result, re-
viewing courts should approach any intentionalist view of that section with caution.
Yet the legislative history of COBRA makes at least one thing is clear, to the extent
that legislative history exists in this area, it supports the concept that COBRA is a
temporary salve intendeJ merely to ensure continued access to the health care system,
not red carpet treatment.
II. ECONOMIC AND PRAGMATIC APPROACHES
Application of each of the generally accepted interpretive tests yields the same
result: consideration of substantive rather than temporal differences in the policies is a
better approach to the interpretive question. If no rules of statutory interpretation exist-
ed, a court applying the "best" view of Section 1162(2)(D) would presumably select
the approach that is the most economically efficient and practical. Such an approach
would further the dual goals of COBRA; ensuring that employees maintain seamless
health insurance coverage while protecting the employers' property rights in not having
to continue paying for employees who are receiving similar benefits elsewhere.
A. Economic Analysis of the Section
Because COBRA forces employers to subsidize the health care of former em-
ployees, employers would like to make such coverage as rare as possible. Former em-
ployees, by contrast, would prefer to treat continuation coverage as an option to be
exercised only if their medical costs will exceed the amount of premiums paid. If they
remain healthy, they reject continuation coverage and if they become ill, they elect
coverage. Recognizing the perverse incentives the COBRA statute creates, Congress at-
tempted to set limits on both sides. While employers must offer the coverage, certain
events will end their obligation to provide it prior to the expiration of the statutory
limit. Similarly, while employees are offered a significant amount of time to decide
whether to elect coverage, there is a point where employees must decide and then
"ante up" the first premium. The rules governing COBRA attempt to balance the needs
of the former employees against the obligations imposed on the employers.
An economic approach to the COBRA statute would also balance the needs of
the employees against the obligations of the employer. Considered from an economic
perspective, the interpretation that makes the most sense is the one that does not en-
courage insurance companies to engage in strategic, economically wasteful behavior.
Only if the courts adopt the approach utilized by the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits can
this goal be achieved. To understand why this is the case, it is worthwhile to examine
the potential effects of the Seventh and Tenth Circuits' view of the statute. Under the
Seventh and Tenth Circuits' view, a person would remain eligible to elect COBRA
continuation coverage even if she was also eligible for primary coverage under a pre-
existing group health insurance arrangement, such as dependent coverage under a
132. Harrman, 978 F.2d at 980. As Judge Easterbrook noted, "[u]nfortunately, Congress made a
mess of things in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 . . . enacted on the last day it met
that year. In their rush to get out of town with a bundle of seasonal goodies for their constituents, the
Members of Congress neglected . . . details ... ." Id.
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spouse's group health plan. A primary deleterious effect of this interpretation would be
the creation of a windfall for insureds with existing insurance coverage and an existing
medical condition. The following example demonstrates how such a windfall might
occur, Imagine an insured who is hospitalized at the time she is terminated from her
job. Her projected hospital stay is three months at a cost of $150,000. Let us assume
that the insured had a preexisting qualification for coverage under her spouse's group
health plan. Under the Seventh-Tenth Circuit approach, the insured would remain eligi-
ble to elect continuation coverage through her former employer.
Faced with the projected medical bills, the employer's insurer would have a
financial incentive to approach the insured and offer her a financial inducement to
reject the continuation coverage, thereby relieving the insurance company of any liabil-
ity. The spouse's plan, faced with accepting this liability, however, would find it in its
best interest to offer the insured a financial inducement to elect the continuation cover-
age. In the face of these competing bidders, the stakes could quickly rise to where one
insurer (the losing bidder) would pay the medical bill, while the other would pay the
insured an amount nearly equal to that same medical bill in order to avoid the insur-
ance pay out.
Ironically, the higher the projected medical bills for the insured at the time she
elects coverage, the greater her expected "jackpot," as the insurers would bid increas-
ing amounts to avoid their insurance liability. More important, perhaps, is that it is
only in situations where a windfall might occur that the Seventh-Tenth Circuit rule
would come into play. If an insured had no preexisting medical condition at the time
of her election, it is extremely unlikely that she would elect to continue paying 102%
of the monthly premiums if she is already covered under another group health plan.
The rule adopted in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits avoids this windfall effect.
Under those cases, a former employee can elect to continue his coverage only when
the alternatively available preexisting coverage has a "gap" for an existing medical
condition. In those instances, however, there is no windfall concern because the poten-
tial windfall insurers would have no reason to bid against one another, because one
insurer (the one with the "gap") would have no liability in any event. This approach
satisfies both the language of the statute and the Congressional purpose underlying
passage of COBRA.
B. Identically Situated Individuals Treated Differently
A secondary consequence of the Fifth and Seventh Circuits' interpretation is that
identically situated individuals would be treated disparately. Disparate treatment is both
inequitable among the individuals affected and inconsistent with what Congress intend-
ed.
Imagine two co-workers, Mr. Smith and Mr. Jones, both of whom are laid off on
the same day, and both of whom wish to keep their current coverage under their
employer's group health plan. The federal government employs Mr. Smith's spouse,
and he is covered under her group health plan. Mr. Jones' spouse is not employed on
the day her husband is laid off, but the following day she obtains a job with the feder-
al government. When she is hired, she, like Mrs. Smith, receives group health insur-
ance that covers her spouse. As a result, both Mr. Smith and Mr. Jones are covered in
exactly the same manner, by exactly the same insurance policy.
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Under the Fifth and Seventh Circuit analyses, the treatment of Mr. Smith and
Mr. Jones for COBRA purposes would be vastly different. Because Mr. Smith was
already covered through his wife's policy at the time he was laid off, he could elect to
continue his own coverage through his employer. Mr. Jones, on the other hand, could
continue his coverage for one day, but, assuming he has elected continuation coverage,
upon becoming covered under his wife's policy the next day, would lose his continua-
tion rights.'33 Thus, under the Fifth and Seventh Circuits' approach, two identically
situated people would receive vastly different treatment.
Differing treatment of similarly situated beneficiaries makes even less sense once
one understands how the second provision of Section 1162(2)(D) has been .interpreted.
Section 1162(2)(D)(ii) of the statute states that an employer may cease to offer contin-
uation coverage if the employee, "first becomes, after the date of election... entitled
to Medicare benefits." Presumably, a court would interpret the words "first becomes"
identically with respect to both provisions of Section 1162(2)(D). If the Supreme Court
were to adopt the Tenth and Seventh Circuits' approach to the "first becomes" lan-
guage, employees who enroll in Medicare prior to termination or layoff would, be
entitled to COBRA continuation coverage for the entire period even while they contin-
ue to receive Medicare benefits. Those employees who did not enroll in Medicare until
after the date of the election, by contrast, would have their continuation coverage ter-
minated.'34
It seems unlikely that Congress would have wished to draw an arbitrary line be-
tween those who were lucky enough to turn 65 and enroll in Medicare before their
133. It is important to acknowledge that had Mr. Jones failed to fill out his election form, he
would be entitled to treatment identical to that of Mr. Smith. Under COBRA, the date of election and
the qualifying event do not always occur on the same day. A qualified beneficiary has sixty days after
notification of COBRA eligibility to elect coverage. 29 U.S.C. § 1165(1) (1994). That section also
specifies that the administrator of a single employer plan has 14 days to notify the terminated or laid
off employee that she is eligible for continuation coverage. Thus, a qualified beneficiary could have 74
days or longer to elect coverage under COBRA. This delay allows a qualified beneficiary ample op-
portunity to obtain additional coverage before electing COBRA continuation coverage. In our example,
if Mr. Jones had not made his election at the time his wife obtained a position with the federal gov-
ernment, he would be entitled both to continuation coverage and to coverage under his wife's plan
because the "other coverage" would not be considered "new" coverage under the Fifth and Seventh
Circuits' interpretation. If, on the other hand, he had filled out his election form before his wife was
hired, he would not be entitled to continuation coverage.
Assuming that most employees fill out their election form on the last day of work, the qualifying
event and the date of election would occur on the same date and the treatment of similarly situated
employees would be different and unfair. Even if the typical employee waited the full sixty days after
notice to elect continuation coverage, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits' approach still treats similarly
situated employees differently. Once again, we can assume that Mr. Smith was covered by his wife's
federal government insurance policy prior to his layoff. Thus, Mr. Smith is entitled to continuation
coverage if he elects it within sixty days after notification. Mr. Jones' wife, on the other hand, did not
obtain a position with the government until forty days of Mr. Jones' eligibility period had expired. If
Mr. Jones knew how the rule worked, he would wait until after his wife had obtained the position to
make an election. If he was unaware of the rule's operation, he might elect coverage sometime prior
to his wife's obtention of the new position and, therefore, be denied extended COBRA coverage. It
seems unlikely that Congress intended a result that required employees to be aware of the inner work-
ings of COBRA in the particular circuit in which the employee lived. Thus, even if the election date
and the qualifying event do not occur at the same time, the rule adopted in the Fifth and Seventh
Circuits appears to treat similarly situated employees differently. See South Dakota Supreme Court
Holds that COBRA Remains Available Despite Medicare Coverage Obtained Prior to Termination of
Employment, 2 No. 5 ERISA Litig. Rep. 7 (1993) for additional applications of this rule.
134. See Roberta Casper Watson, COBRA Continuation Health Benefits C980 ALI-ABA 899 (1995).
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date of election and similarly situated employees, who unfortunately either had not
turned 65 by the date of election or who simply failed to enroll in Medicare prior to
the date of election. Because there is no reason to think that Congress wanted to treat
these similarly situated employees differently, the only equitable approach is to treat
the employees similarly. In other words, an employee who has Medicare coverage at
any time after the date of election is not entitled to COBRA continuation coverage. 3
To read the statute to reach the opposite result would do violence to the notion that
laws should treat similarly situated people similarly.
IV. CONCLUSION
Considered from virtually every interpretive angle, the inescapable conclusion is
that an individual fortunate enough to obtain insurance coverage prior to the date of
COBRA election should not receive treatment different than an individual who obtains
alternate coverage after the date of election. Both events should serve to terminate the
beneficiary's entitlement to COBRA coverage.
Although there may be some question whether the plain language of the statute
supports this conclusion, there is no question that for COBRA's success, the proper
interpretive analysis would be limited to insuring seamless single coverage for employ-
ees, not arbitrary dual coverage. Any other interpretation would undermine COBRA's
dual goals: protecting employees from situations where their health care has been dis-
continued and ensuring that employers are not overburdened by the excessive admin-
istrative and operating costs that accompany COBRA's mandate that qualified benefi-
ciaries have health coverage.
Moreover, any other interpretation does not make sense from an economic or
pragmatic perspective. Considering the current political climate, it makes sense for
courts to adopt an efficient and equitable interpretation of a statute especially in a case,
like this one, where the fairest interpretation is one that is consistent with both the
statute's purpose and language. Lutheran Hospital and Oakley must not stand.
135. Interestingly enough, at least one circuit court has determined that eligibility for Medicare,
whether it occurs before or after the date of election, serves to terminate the beneficiary's continuation
coverage rights. In Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Tex., Inc. v. Shalala, 995 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1993),
the Fifth Circuit found that COBRA coverage terminates when a person becomes entitled to Medicare
benefits regardless of whether the eligibility began before or after the date of election. The court stated
that Congress could have amended COBRA to exempt End Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) sufferers from
the termination provision as it had for retirees of bankrupt companies. According to the court,
"Congress' demonstrated ability to clearly amend COBRA" to exempt certain classes of people meant
that its failure to do so is strong evidence that eligibility for Medicare terminates one's rights to re-
ceive continuation benefits under COBRA." Id. at 74.
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